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jurors than members of another race in a particular case, Strauder
should be extended either by statute or. judicial interpretation to prevent states from infringing upon the prospective Negro juror's fourteenth amendment right not to be discriminated against because of
race in the selection of juries.
Larry A. Neuman
F, L= LAw-CHrD CusToDY-PtoMiscurry. - A mother who had
been granted a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment was awarded custody and control of her two infant children.
Thereafter, the mother secured employment and immediately became
attracted to a co-worker. After a short courtship, she became pregnant,
whereupon the newly-found paramour divorced his wife to marry her.
However, a week before his divorce was to be granted, the mother
and lover began to live together as man and -wife, keeping the two
children. When this situation was brought to the attention of the
father of the children, he attempted to have the couple arrested for
adultery; however, they moved to Virginia to avoid prosecution. In
Virginia, they entered into a marriage, which was void because the
lover's divorce was not final. The couple later legally married on the
same day the divorce decree was finalized. Armed with this evidence,
the father of the two children secured a judgement from the Harlan
Circuit Court transferring the custody and control of his two children
to himself. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held:
Reversed. Jones v. Sulton, 388 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1965).
In its efforts to determine in whose custody and control the welfare of the children could better be served, the court declared the
following to be the proper interpretation of promiscuity: "Promiscuity
is not an isolated incident of sexual relations with one particular
person, but denotes an indiscriminate grant of physical favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love."' In holding that appellee had not proved appellant to be a promiscuous
woman, the court stated further: "We have held in many cases that
although the mother has been indiscreet with a man she married
shortly after her divorce, such indiscretions do not necessarily brand
28

The original purpose of Strauder was to use the equal protection clause
to prevent states from denying a Negro a fair trial by his peers. 100 U.S. 303,
309. In a pluralistic society "peers" no longer means just a member of the accused's race. In any given case if the accused can show that he'was denied a
fair trial by his peers as a result of the exclusion of a member of any race from
I Jones v. Sutton, 388 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1965).
his jury, he should have the standing to appeal the decision.
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her as a person unfit to have the custody of her young children. There
must, in addition, be evidence of promiscuity."2
Let us now consider those cases to which the court in Jones
3
referred, and upon which it relied. In Ruttencutter v. Ruttencutter,
in which case there was an allegation of intimacy between the mother
involved and a man she later married, the wife had been granted a
divorce from her bad-tempered and pugnacious husband, who often
struck both the mother and their eight-year-old child. The control and
custody of the child were granted to the mother. Allegations of
lascivious conduct were denied by the wife, and no improper conduct
on her part was proved. The court in Ruttencutter thought that a
similar case, Altemnaier v. Rachford,4 , was controlling. In the latter
case, there existed only an intimation that the mother had been too
friendly with her second husband prior to the separation from her
first.
The rule in both Ruttencutter and Rachford is that the court will
not "convict one against whom .

.

. charges [of lascivious conduct]

are preferred, except upon clear and convincing testimony." 5
Obviously these two cases turned on the sufficiency of the evidence
to establish facts relating to the alleged improper conduct, whereas
in Jones v. Sutton the facts were well in evidence, and the issue as
viewed by .the Court of Appeals was one of interpretation of the law.
The court in Sutton relies next on Clark v. Clark.6 In that case, the
Court of Appeals found that a divorce which had been granted to the
wife on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, when the trial
court had held that the husband's proof had not sustained allegations
of lewd and lascivious conduct on the part of the wife, ought to have
been granted to the husband on the evidence supporting these allegations. Nevertheless, the court sustained the judgement and awarded custody of the five-year-old child to the wife, finding that the
evidence did not establish that the appellee had been "promiscuously
immoral," since her indiscretions were limited to one man, whom she
later married. It is submitted, however, that the decision in the Clark
case in reality turned on the fact that the father would, of necessity,
be frequently away from the area and separated from his child even if
he were awarded custody. This contention is supported by the court's
conclusion that "if the father is able at some time in the future
Ibid.
,k
3393 Ky. 556, 169 S.W.2d 604 (1943).
4 291 Ky. 845, 165 S.W.2d 848 (1942).
5 Supra note 3, at 607.
6298 Ky. 18, 181 S.W.2d 397 (1944).
2
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to show himself more advantageously situated to care for the child,
he should be awarded its custody for a substantial portion of the
time."7 Thus, the issue presented in Sutton-whether or not lewd and
lascivious conduct could be considered sufficient to establish promiscuty to prevent the award of custody to the mother-should not be
answered by the Clark decision, since that decision was colored by
the father's inability to care for the children.
The next case looked to for support by the Sutton court was Price
v. Price,8 which held that the award of custody of a two and one-half
year-old daughter to the mother from whom the husband had been
granted a divorce, was not an abuse of discretion-despite evidence
from the mother's diary indicating that she had been indiscreet with
another man whom she loved and subsequently married.
In the next case cited in Jones v. Sutton, the judgement of the
chancellor was modified to provide that the mother be given custody
of her eight-year-old son for three summer months of each year.9
There, the mother had been married at the age of sixteen years, one
year after being released from an orphanage. The marriage took
place while the father was on a ten-day furlough, after which the
couple was permanently separated. The court was convinced that
the mother's inexperience and immaturity contributed to her indiscretion; that she loved the man with whom she had been indiscreet
and whom she later married; and, as a consequence, the award of
complete and exclusive custody to the father was an abuse of discretion.
Upon analysis it is apparent that Ruttencutter has imposed an
onerous burden on the complaining former husband by means of the
"clear and convincing testimony" test, since proof in many instances of
lascivious or promiscuous conduct is difficult to assemble and present,
without resort to questionable sources and means. Equally apparent is
that the Clark case is clearly distinguishable since the necessary
absence of the father was a deciding factor. Also perceivable is the
fact that the court in the Price case, while purporting to follow Clark,
actually erroneously effected a shift in emphasis to the curative effect
of a subsequent marriage, since the factor of the father's separation
from the children, determinative in Clark, was absent here. Finally,
the Hager decision was based not on pure fact or law, but almost
exclusively on what may be termed "judicial compassion.' Therefore,
on review of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in Jones v. Sut7

Id. at 898.
8306 Ky. 214, 206 SAV.2d 924 (1947).

9 Hager v. Hager, Ky. 803, 219 S.W.2d 10 (1949).
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ton, it appears that not one decision was dictative of the holding.
In conclusion, the following questions stand out: Will not the
holding in Jones v. Sutton impose an insurmountable burden on a
husband seeking custody of his children because his wife is having
illicit relations with another man who she "loves"? Will not the holding
require the husband who is himself without moral turpitude, to
continue in his unsatisfactory marriage or be denied the custody of
his children simply because his wife later marries her paramour?
Lamentably, it appears that the Court of Appeals, in its interpretation,
has, for all practical purposes, written the father out in custody
questions involving the wayward but selective wife.
Bing I. Bush

